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A Matter of Method: British Aristotelianism and
the New Science. Essay Review
F.G. Sacco
Essay Review of Steffen Ducheyne, The Main Business of Natural Philosophy:
Isaac Newton’s Natural-Philosophical Methodology, Dordrecht: Springer, 2012,
p. XXV+354 (ISBN 9789400721258, € 259); Marco Sgarbi, The Aristotelian Tradi-
tion and the Rise of British Empiricism: Logic and Epistemology in British Isles
(1570-1689), Dordrecht: Springer, 2013, XII + 260 pp. (ISBN 9789400749504, € 209).
1 The books of Steffen Ducheyne andMarco Sgarbi share somethingmorethan the publisher. Both deal with British empiricism and its Aristotelianbackground. The existence of such a background as claimed by Sgarbi, chal-lenges the traditional prevalence of Platonism and anti-Aristotelianism in 17ᵗʰ-
century Britain. Ducheyne, on the other hand, claims the Aristotelian roots
of Newtonian methodology. According to Ducheyne, Newtonian method was
very different from hypothetico-deductive methodology. Newton’s use of hy-
pothesis was part of a more general methodology divided in two phases: the
construction of a model and its application including the formation and the
testing of theories (p. 56-57). In this context, the nature of hypotheses changes
with respect to the mechanical philosophy.
Newton was involved in the quest for a demonstrative and rigorous method
till the 1680s, a decade that represents a turning point in his physical andmethod-
ological work. After the correspondence on planetarymotionwith Robert Hooke
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in 1679-1680, Newton radically changed his ideas on celestial mechanics. At the
same time, his methodology reached the stage later maintained in the Principia.
“Although in his early optical work Newton had clearly formulated an ideal of
establishing demonstrative causes, a clear formulation of the method by which
to arrive at “deductions from phenomena” was still lacking. It was only by the
time of the Principia that Newton could answer this issue in a sufficiently de-
tailedway” (p. 184). Newton’smasterpiece of 1687 is at the centre of Ducheyne’s
work. In the Principia the new method operated in a way that Newton was not
able to reproduce in the Opticks. Book I and II of the Principia offer the empiri-
cal foundation to the discussion of Keplerian laws. Newtonian’s model for the
explication of celestial motions according to Kepler’s laws is based on the new
laws of mechanics developed with empirical evidence in the first two books.
The first phase of the method, viz. the construction of the model, is completed
with the elaboration of a model for Keplerian laws. In book III the second phase
begins with the application of this model to the movements of celestial bodies
and the formation of the theory of universal gravitation. The remaining of the
Principia essentially consists in the last phase of the method, i.e. the application
of the theory. Unlike Cartesian vortexes’ hypothesis, Newtonianmodel is firmly
based on the laws of motions. Newton refused ad hoc factors to explain discrep-
ancies between the phenomena and themathematical results derived from ideal
conditions.Thanks to the good approximation between the laws of motions and
the celestial trajectories described by planets, which entailed the absence of any
relevant resistance compatible with the presence of a dense ether, Newton could
conclude for the inexistence of Cartesian vortexes.
According to Ducheyne, the Principia’s methodology is consistent with a
non-mathematical concept of gravity, since it is related to a non-mechanical
idea of causes. Unlike Cartesian hypotheses, causes in Newtonian model are
not only explanatory but also true because they supply the necessary expla-
nations of the observed phenomena. For Ducheyne, Newton’s assumption of a
causal approach is the proof of the non-mathematical origins of his methodol-
ogy. “From a conceptual point of view the mathematical account of analysis and
synthesis is incompatible with Newton’s conception of analysis as discovering
causes and of synthesis as assuming these causes to explain other phenom-
ena. In the mathematical tradition analysis consists of reasoning from what
is sought to what is known. In Newton’s natural-philosophical view, analy-
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sis consisted in reasoning from what is known, the effect, to what is sought,
the cause” (pp. 7-8). According to Ducheyne, the theory of regressus demon-
strativus developed by British Aristotelians shares common features with the
Newtonian method of deduction from phenomena and represents the best can-
didate to explain the origins of Newtonian methodology. Both are composed of
two consecutive phases: analysis or resolutio, proceeding from the effects to the
causes, and synthesis or compositio, proceeding from the causes to the effects
(p. 4). Furthermore, Ducheyne’s thesis is supported by the evidence of New-
ton’s direct study of a relevant Aristotelian textbook, such as Samuel Smith’s
Aditus ad logicam (p. 16). Thus, Aristotelian influence, along with Isaac Bar-
row’s mathematical work, supported the Newtonian quest for a demonstrative
method in natural philosophy and his refusal of the Baconian legacy embraced
by the Royal Society’s virtuosi.
What Ducheyne describes as the “Newtonian Style”, following I. Bernard Co-
hen (1982), does not work in Newtonian optics. Since the beginning of the New-
tonian researches on light and colours, discrepancies between methodological
demands and epistemological results emerged. Unlike Principia’s laws, New-
ton’s definition of white light as the heterogeneous mixture of coloured rays
could not be deduced from experiments. According to Newtonian methodol-
ogy, from the brilliant experiment of double diffraction realized in the second
half of 1660s one can only deduce that, after the decomposition of white light
by the first prism, the singular coloured rays refracted by the second prism
maintain their colours. “Since heterogeneity of light cannot be derived from
phenomena, it qualifies as being a hypothesis according to Newton’s criteria.
Ultimately, Newton had only provided a sufficient cause for prismatic disper-
sion, not a necessary and sufficient one” (p. 196). But for Ducheyne this is not
incompatible with Newtonian style, because Newton’s inference from the ob-
servable immutability of refracted coloured rays to their state before diffraction
is consistent with his third regula philosophandi, the so-called analogy of nature,
and with Newton’s use of the so-called transduction or transdictive inference
in the analysis of brief-scale attractive forces in the Principia. As Mandelbaum
(1664, p. 87) and McGuire (1970, p. 4) pointed out, since it enables to overcome
the limits of experience and sense perception inferring the unknown status of
unobservable entities, the Newtonian third rule is not an induction rule. This
is the case for Newtonian conclusions on the state of light rays before the first
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diffraction in the experimentum crucis of 1672. Attributing to coloured rays the
property of immutability before the diffraction, Newton operated an inferential
process similar to that described in the third rule of the Principia.
Thus Ducheyne can conclude that the epistemological problems of Newton’s
optical works are due to the state of the discipline and not to the high de-
mands of his juvenile methodology. Despite Newtonian methodology evolved
till the mature formulation of the Principia, the epistemological problems at the
heart of his construction remained inTheOpticks, resisting to the Principia-style
methodizing. According to Ducheyne, this is because optics did not reach the
status of physico-mathematics acquired by mechanics and remained a mixed
science (p. 220-1).
Ducheyne’s analysis of Newtonian optics rigorously reflects Newton’s point
of view. In his reconstruction, little space is conceded to the disputes following
the appearance of The New Theory of Light and Colours in 1672. The reasons of
Robert Hooke and Christian Huygens are not adequately discussed, despite the
emergence of the most evident limits of Newton’s early optical work is due to
Hooke’s criticism. As Niccolò Guicciardini (2009, p. 21) observed, the method-
ological programme of the New Theory was “a rather extremist methodological
position”. But, unfortunately, the way this initial position evolved till the Prin-
cipia’s methodology is not adequately highlighted by the book.
2 Sgarbi’sTheMain Business of Natural Philosophy is a study of two books,or rather one, the Principia. It offers a rigorous and insightful analysisof the structure of Newton’s masterpiece, but does not notice the existence ofa long and complex work of elaboration and revision of Newtonian work, so
relevant for the understanding of his theories. This is probably due to the au-
thor’s questionable decision to restrict the analysis to the “method of justifi-
cation”, excluding the “method of discovery” (p. 63). Nevertheless, Ducheyne
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seems to believe that logical and methodological (British) Aristotelianism in-
fluenced Newtonian science.
Despite some initial caveats, Sgarbi maintains a similar belief about British
experimental philosophy of the 17ᵗʰ century. The relationship between Paduan
Aristotelianism and the new science is a topic widely discussed by historians of
science. In the introduction to The Aristotelian Tradition and the Rise of British
Empiricism, Sgarbi inclines for a moderate version of John Randall’s continuist
thesis (Randall 1961), because “Randall’s argument was narrower and less am-
bitious” than his critics realized: “He aimed simply to demonstrate certain con-
ceptual analogies between the thought of some Paduan Aristotelians and that
of the early scientists, in their use of particular terms such as ‘analysis’, ‘synthe-
sis’, ‘induction’ etc.” (p. 4). Building on Randall’s moderate programme, Sgarbi
states that his book “aims to investigate how themap of Paduan Aristotelianism
was replaced and absorbed into the movement known as ‘British Empiricism’,
and not into modern science” (p. 6). But by the end of the book readers appre-
hend that “the emergence of experimental philosophy marked not the defeat of
British logical Aristotelianism, but a strong empiricist turn in the elaboration
of a new epistemology.The heirs to this tradition were Locke’s precursors, who
made sensation and induction the real instruments of logic: British Aristotelians
no longer indulged in hypothetical and metaphysical speculations that were of-
ten untestable or inexplicable, rather emphasized that experience, acquired by
observation and experiment, was the ground of science” (p. 233). This harmo-
nizing view of the late Scholasticism and the new science is grounded on the
empiric character of British Aristotelianism and supported by the decisive me-
diation of the Paduan Aristotelian Harvey and the “latent” Aristotelians Bacon
and Hobbes (p. 197).
The insufficiency of the traditional view of British empiricism is challenged
by showing the large diffusion of Aristotelian philosophy in 17ᵗʰ-century Britain.
The book carefully follows the rise and fall of Ramist logic in British universities
and the affirmation of Paduan Aristotelianism from the end of the 16ᵗʰ century.
Sgarbi’s analysis is not limited to Oxford and Cambridge, but takes into ac-
count all the universities operating in early modern British Isles. A chapter on
Zabarella doctrine of induction, analysis and synthesis, precedes the accurate
reconstruction of the defeat of the prevailing Ramism in British universities by
means of the dissemination of Paduan textbooks, such as Giulio Pace’s bilingual
A Matter of Method: British Aristotelianism and the New Science. Essay Review 7 : 5
(Greek and Latin) edition of Aristotle’sOrganon of 1584, his Institutiones logicae
(1597) and his Logica rudimenta (1612). Thanks to their propaedeutic simplicity,
Pace’s works were able to answer the demand of new textbooks requested by
the reforms of the university statutes, such as the Laudian statutes of 1636. Fur-
thermore, as Sgarbi accurately points out, Paduan Aristotelism reached British
Isles also by means of the works of German scholars, such as Bartholomäus
Kekermann. Continental textbooks offered to British scholars a new approach
to the traditional peripatetic questions, and favoured the formation of a local
tradition of Aristotelian thought with new features. Only in an initial phase
British Aristotelianism took the shape of a simple repetition of the thesis of
Zabarella. In contrast, Smith, Edward Brerewood, John Sanderson and Richard
Crakanthorpe emphasized the role of the empirical part of the method devel-
oping Zabarella’s theory of induction.
In the hands of the Paduan professor of natural philosophy, the Aristotelian
epagôgê was not a real syllogistic demonstration, but only a clarification of
things already known by sensation. Unlike demonstrative syllogism, for Zaba-
rella induction did not demonstrate unknown things by means of prior knowl-
edge, rather it was a “process by which particulars are comprehended under
the general universal concept, but properly it does not create new knowledge
beyond what the mind has already acquired by sensation” (p. 69). Following
Zabarella, a generation of British Aristotelians emphasized the sensible origin
of knowledge and the primacy of analysis on synthesis. Since analysis did not
have the demonstrative nature of synthesis, it proceeded from the effects to the
causes, and produced the fundaments of any possible knowledge. Then anal-
ysis would be possible without synthesis, not vice versa because analysis is
the base of synthesis. This empirical foundation of knowledge is stressed by
Robert Sanderson, the author of Logicae artis compendium (1615), a treatise
read and annotated by Newton along with Smith’s Aditus ad logicam (1613).
For Sanderson induction is the last step of a complex process of knowledge-
acquisition starting from senses perception. It consists in a sufficient enumer-
ations of particular experiences and establishes a universal conclusion. Both
Sanderson and Crackanthorpe were aware of the dangers of this kind of in-
duction, because even a single case could invalidate it. Their development of
Paduan tradition, stressing the importance of sensation, observation and induc-
tion, was largely dominant in British universities.The large diffusion of the new
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textbooks suggests the influence of this empirically-oriented Aristotelianism
on British modern empiricism. But this goes beyond the chronological limits
of the book. Sgarbi does not renounce, however, to take into account the rela-
tionship between the prevailing Aristotelianism and the thoughts of the some
English reformers of scientific knowledge, Francis Bacon, William Harvey and
Thomas Hobbes. Thus, the accurate reconstruction of a neglected ancestor of
modern British empiricism turns into a reappraisal of the old continuist theses.
For Sgarbi, Bacon’s interest for induction and his reforms is nothing else but the
effects of the influence of the British scholars for the logical tools. “If Bacon fo-
cused on an inductive methodology for science, it was precisely because of the
great attention which contemporary Aristotelians paid to the problem of induc-
tion and experience” (p. 168). In Sgarbi’s eyes, Bacon’s criticism of traditional
induction does not entail a rejection of Aristotelian logic. On the contrary, Ba-
con accepted it but insisted for a strong reform (p. 170). His criticism of Aris-
totelian logic was not against Brerewood’s, Sanderson’s and Crackanthorpe’s
work, but only against Zabarella, whose concept of induction “was not really
a process of discovery, but rather of notification of something already known
by sensation” (p. 172-3). The influence of Aristotelianism on Harvey’s method-
ology is less problematic. Harvey’s debt with Paduan tradition is well known,
but it is significant that the preface to De generatione animalium (1651) restored
the original Paduan Aristotelianism against its British developments. Accord-
ing to Sgarbi even the anti-scholastic Hobbes could not avoid the influence of
the new British logical textbooks on a significant part of his logical theory. Al-
though Sgarbi recognizes the experimental character of the new science and the
unfamiliarity of Aristotelian philosophers with mechanical arts and their inter-
vention in nature, he affirms that “the dissemination of the works of Bacon,
Harvey and Hobbes did not make the end of the Aristotelian tradition; rather,
with their latent Aristotelianism they promoted the integration of Aristotelian
philosophy and the new science” (p. 197).
As in other similar reconstructions, such as Anstey and Vanzo (2012, pp. 509-
514), in Sgarbi’s view Bacon’s work is not a watershed separating the new phi-
losophy from the old scholastic, rather it is the necessary link between them.
Thus, in contrast with Ducheyne’s view, Sgarbi arguments for a wide influ-
ence of British Aristotelian methodology on the whole experimental philoso-
phy, from Baconians virtuosi to the young Newton. The contrast between Ba-
A Matter of Method: British Aristotelianism and the New Science. Essay Review 7 : 7
con’s Aristotelian background claimed by Sgarbi and Bacon’s idea of science
drawn by scholars such as Mary Hesse (1968), Paolo Rossi (1984) and Brian
Vickers (1992; 2007) is evident. But whatever interpretation one chooses, it
is difficult to ignore the substantial inefficacy of Bacon’s method along with
the general insufficiency of historical positivist reconstruction which identifies
modern science with the inductive method. If we look beyond their deceptive
methodological statements, not any of the experimental philosophers gathered
in the Royal Society really adopted Bacon’s cumbersome methodology, neither
did they faithfully follow his induction or his tables. On the contrary, Bacon’s
work passed through a process of selective reading, influenced by different cul-
tural aims and social backgrounds. AsMichael Lynch (2001) observed, the result
of this process was the existence of “different styles of Baconianism”. In short,
every experimental philosopher selected his own Bacon.
3 In early modern natural philosophy, methodological statements oftendo not describe the real practice of natural philosophers; instead they area decisive argument to sustain some hypotheses and principles. In this respect,Newton’s experimentum crucis is significant. In the letter of 1672 to the Royal
Society, the new theory of light and colours appears as the result of a rigorous
induction or rather deduction from the phenomena observed in the experiment
of the double refraction. On the contrary, Newtonian unpublished optical pa-
pers suggest a different genesis of his revolutionary ideas. Between 1661 and
1664, as the notes on colours in Quaestiones quedam philosophicae show, New-
ton optical inquiries started with the discussion of Cartesian and Atomistic hy-
pothesis.¹ At this stage the young student made a first step towards a different
¹ TheQuestiones quaedam philosophicae, like most of Newton’s unpublished papers are now avail-
able at http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk.
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theory, considering the hypothesis of a double composition of white light in fast
and slow rays: dark colours originate from the slow rays; light colours from the
fast ones; white, grey and black from their mixture. Despite refraction was con-
ceived as a division of different rays, the difference itself consisted in degrees
of speed, and nothing in the notes suggests that Newton conceived it as an
inherent and inalterable propriety of the coloured rays in white light. Is it a co-
incidence that the criticism of Cartesian physics coexists in the same notebook
with a critical view of Cartesian hypotheses of light and colours? The presence
in the same notebook of an atomistic commitment suggests that the genesis of
Newtonian optical theories was influenced by his atomistic assumptions.
Between 1666 and 1669, Newton developed his initial hypothesis by means
of a new series of experiments. The famous experimentum crucis was an instru-
ment to develop not only his hypothesis but also to demonstrate the limits of the
Cartesians ones. By means of a double set of prisms Newton could then refine
his hypothesis inwhat he presented as a theory in 1672. As hewrote to the Royal
Society, the experimentum crucis was nothing else than a “specimen” of a long
series of experiments. Unlike Kepler, who presented in his Astronomia nova the
long series of hypotheses employed in the ‘war’ against Mars, Newtonian nar-
ration did not refer to the hypotheses preceding the new theory. Adopting the
expression experimentum crucis, Newton described it as the result of a rigorous
inductive process, a demonstrative deduction from the phenomena leaving no
space to mechanic hypotheses and uncertain conjecture (Bechler 1974, p. 116,
Blay 1985, p. 372, Dear 1985, p. 155, Giudice 2009, pp. 69-74). The whole New-
tonian theory is invested by demonstrative certainty and experimental founda-
tion, included the assumption of the heterogeneous nature of white light. But,
as Ducheyne noted, this became the greatest obstacle to the extension of the
Principia’s methodology to optics, because it cannot be observed at all, but only
assumed on the base of a transdictive inference. Only after Hooke’s criticism
on this point, Newton reduced his highly methodological demand in the field of
optics. It was no coincidence that he decided to publish The Opticks only after
Hooke’s death in 1703.
This case does not entail the denial of any role for methodology in early
modern science. Methodological ideas influenced the way scientists conceived
problems and solutions in their research practice. But it is difficult to main-
tain the old positivist idea of an inductive method, whose origins are rooted
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in the theoretical appeal to experience by the British Aristotelians emphasized
by Ducheyne and Sgarbi. According to this view, the complete identification
of scientific practice with a codified methodology dissolves the complex nature
of modern science into abstract epistemology. However, methodological ideas
play different roles in scientific practice, which includes among other things,
the a-posteriori justification of revolutionary conclusions by means of clear and
indisputable philosophical principles, despite those conclusion were carried out
in different ways. The revaluation of the role of methodology in post-positivist
studies of science helped to understand the complex character of modern nat-
ural philosophy, whose experimental character is seemingly more dependent
on the world of Renaissance mechanics, alchemy and natural magic than the
Aristotelian and Scholastic theoretical empiricism. Newtonian’s experimentum
crucis seems to confirm that it is from the active intervention on nature, by one
side, and the recourse to mathematics by the other, that so complex a thing
called new science originated.
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